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VOLUME 64 WINTER 1990 NUMBER 2
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: NIGHTMARE FOR EMPLOYERS
AND DREAM FOR LAWYERS?
THOMAS H. BARNARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time in over twenty years, Congress has passed
what truly may be described as major civil rights legislation. The
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),' directed at discrimina-
tion against disabled Americans, represents one of the first con-
crete fulfillments of President Bush's campaign promise to create a
"kinder, gentler America." A major component of the statute, Title
I, is designed to prohibit employment discrimination against the
disabled. Its lofty goal is to help millions of people with disabilities
who want to work but cannot find jobs. However, the ADA is also
likely to create major difficulties for employers trying to comply
with the new law, and thus it may become a source of frequent
litigation.
The ADA enjoyed, not only the support of the Bush Adminis-
tration, but widespread support in both the Senate' and the House
of Representatives. The Senate passed its version of the ADA on
September 7, 1989 by a vote of 76 to 8.2 The House version of the
* B.A. 1961, University of Puget Sound; LL.B. 1964, Columbia Law School; LL.M.
1970, Case Western Reserve Law School. Thomas H. Barnard is a partner in the Cleveland
law firm of Duvin, Cahn & Barnard, whose practice is exclusively devoted to representing
management in labor and employment matters.
I Americans with Disabilities Act, Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 136 (July 16, 1990) [here-
inafter "ADA"].
2 Senate Passage of Civil Rights Bill Moves Debate Over Disabled to House, Daily
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legislation was passed by a vote of 403 to 20 on May 22, 1990.' The
Bill was signed into law by President Bush on July 26, 1990 with
the considerable fanfare usually accompanying such historic mo-
ments.4 Despite the Bill's rapid march through Congress-it was
first introduced in both Houses on May 9, 1989 5-the ADA has
evolved over a period of at least seventeen years. By the late
1960's, after Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19646 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,'
concern about protecting disabled Americans was already growing.8
In fact, by the early 1970's Congress had prepared and passed the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973' to protect disabled Americans. The Re-
habilitation Act, however, covered only federal contractors, 10 recip-
ients of federal financial assistance, and the executive branch of
the federal government.1 Many believed that an amendment to
Title VII to protect disabled persons would follow shortly after a
shake-out period and some experience with the Rehabilitation Act.
However, because of the unique problems encountered in protect-
ing the disabled, revealed partly through the Rehabilitation Act's
enforcement, the shake-out period took much longer than anyone
expected.
A strong case can be made for protecting disabled individuals
from all forms of discrimination, including employment discrimi-
nation. According to a Lou Harris poll contained in the Senate Re-
port to its version of the Bill, "two thirds of all disabled Americans
between the age[s] of 16 and 64 are not working at all," yet
"[s]ixty-six percent of working-age disabled persons, who are not
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 174, at A-5 (Sept. 11, 1989).
' House Overwhelmingly Approves Bill to Bar Employment Bias Against Disabled,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-16 (May 23, 1990).
4 See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1990, at 26, col. 1.
5 Bill to Prohibit Employment Discrimination Against Disabled Introduced Into Sen-
ate, House, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at A-7 (May 11, 1989).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988)).
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
8 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2076, 2077-91 (Committee on Labor and Public Welfare's report sup-
porting passage of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
1 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988)).
10 Id. § 793.
" Id. § 794.
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working, say that they would like to have a job."12 The poll also
revealed that "[e]ighty-two percent of people with disabilities said
they would give up their government benefits in favor of a full time
job.' 1 3 Moreover, it also uncovered that "[i]n 1984, fifty percent of
all adults with disabilities had household incomes of $15,000 or
less. Among non-disabled persons, only twenty-five percent had
household incomes in this wage bracket." 4
One basic problem with legislation protecting the disabled, in
contrast to other civil rights legislation in the employment field, is
that disabled persons do not fall into distinct categories, such as
male or female, under or over forty, or black, white, or hispanic.
Who is considered disabled is a fundamental question that is not
always easily answered. There are other significant distinctions as
well. The following analysis demonstrates that the ADA, perhaps
out of necessity, forces an individualized inquiry into many of the
issues surrounding its enforcement. An inquiry is made to deter-
mine: (1) who is disabled; (2) who is a "qualified individual," not-
withstanding his or her disability; and (3) whether that otherwise
qualified person can be accommodated to perform the job for
which he or she has applied or has been hired without undue hard-
ship to the employer. The accommodation requirement distin-
guishes the ADA from almost every other legislation of this kind,
by forcing the employer to apply an unequal, rather than an equal
treatment standard. Hence, even with the seventeen years experi-
ence of the Rehabilitation Act, it is no surprise that Title I will not
become effective for the twenty-four months following its enact-
ment. "'5 During this period, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") must issue regulations which will explain
this otherwise comprehensive legislation.' 6 Even after this excep-
tionally long gestation period, the ADA will become a lawyer's
dream and an employer's nightmare.
12 S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
I Id.
14 Id.
16 ADA, supra note 1, § 108, at S-5.
16 Compare ADA, supra note 1, § 107, at S-4, 5, with Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988))
(Rehabilitation Act contains fewer details regarding employment discrimination).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ADA
A. A Blend of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act
The ADA is a broad civil rights statute banning discrimination
on the basis of disability, not only in the area of employment, but
also in public transportation, 7 public accommodation, 8 and tele-
phone services and communications. 9 This Article will focus on
Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employment discrimination.
For the most part, Title I was carefully crafted to tie in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with sections 503 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and its implementing regulations. The
effort to blend these provisions together is obvious to employment
law practitioners. Further, the legislative history reveals that this
was the goal behind Title I. In fact, the Senate Report states:
Title I of the ADA specifies that an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
may not discriminate against any qualified individual with a disa-
bility in regard to any term, condition or privilege of employment.
The ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination
set out in regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable
accommodations unless it would result in an undue hardship of
the operation of the business. The ADA incorporates by reference
the enforcement provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [including injunctive relief and backpay]. °
B. A Summary of the Provisions
The provisions of the ADA can be rather easily summarized,
notwithstanding a number of potential legal pitfalls which also will
be discussed.
"Disability" is defined in section three of the Act to mean
"with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C)
being regarded as having such impairment. ' '2' This definition is
1 See ADA, supra note 1, subtit. B, at S-5.
, See id. tit. III, S-9.
" See id. tit. IV, S-13.
20 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 2.
" ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2), at S-3.
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comparable to the definition of the term "handicapped individual"
found in section 7 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.22 One interest-
ing yet minor change, is the use of the term "disability" instead of
"handicap. 2 3 This change represents an effort by Congress to
make use of currently accepted, up-to-date terminology. During
the hearings on this legislation, individuals with disabilities and or-
ganizations representing them objected to the use of such terms as
"handicapped persons" or "the handicapped."2 '
Title I itself defines a "qualified individual with a disability"
as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires. 2 5 A "qualified
individual" does not include any employee who is a current user of
illegal drugs.26
The next step prohibits covered entities from discriminating
"against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee com-
pensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment..'27 Discrimination also includes the failure of an
employer to make "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations" of the qualified individual who is
an applicant or employee, unless the employer can demonstrate
that the accommodation would impose an "undue hardship on the
operation of [its business]."2 s It is also discrimination under the
ADA to deny an employment opportunity to a qualified individual
with a disability because of the need to reasonably accommodate
him or her.29
22 See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 361 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988)).
23 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 21.
21 H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, at 50. It is, perhaps, reminiscent of
similar changes in terminology to reflect sensitivities of protected groups, such as from
"Colored" to "Negro" to "Black" to "African-American."
22 ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), at S-3.
26 Id. § 104(a), at S-4. However, an individual who is otherwise handicapped shall not
be excluded from the protections of this Act if such individual also uses or is addicted to
drugs. Id.
2" Id. § 102(a), at S-3. Compare the regulations implementing section 794 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 25; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (1988).
28 ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5)(A), at S-3; see also 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1989).
29 ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5)(B), at S-3.
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The ADA devotes specific attention to medical examinations
and inquiries of job applicants. Generally, these are prohibited, ex-
cept that an inquiry may be made to determine the ability of an
applicant to perform job-related functions. Medical examinations
may only be conducted after an offer of employment has been
made, provided that all entering employees are examined and the
information is kept confidential.30 Testing for the use of illegal
drugs, which is not considered a medical examination within the
meaning of the statute, is excepted from the rule. 1
Once employment begins, an employer may not require medi-
cal examinations or conduct inquiries "unless such examination or
inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity." 2
Section 103 sets forth three limited defenses to charges of dis-
crimination under the ADA. First, an employer may assert the de-
fense of business necessity, premised on job-relatedness, to a
charge "that an alleged application of qualification standards,
tests, or selection criteria . . . screen out or tend to screen out"
disabled individuals, i.e., disparate impact claims.33 Second, an em-
ployer "may include a requirement that an individual [with a cur-
rently contagious disease or infection] shall not pose a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." '34 Fi-
nally, an employer may assert a religious entity defense similar to
the one in Title VII.3 5
Section 104 of the Act addresses the problems of alcohol and
illegal drugs. In general, employers may prohibit the use of alcohol
or illegal drugs at the workplace; may require that employees not
be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs at the workplace;
and may require that employees conform their behavior to require-
-0 Id. § 102(c)(3), at S-3, 4. According to the Senate Report, "all entering employees"
may be limited to a category of employees, such as all police officers, as compared to all city
employees. SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 39. This provision can be a trap for the un-
wary. If an offer is withdrawn after the prospective employee has submitted to a medical
exam, a prima facie case of discrimination is established. The employer must then be pre-
pared to defend his actions by offering a reason acceptable under ADA guidelines.
11 ADA, supra note 1, § 102(c)(4), at S-4.
32 Id.
Id. § 103(a), at S-4.
2, Id. § 103(b), at S-4.
Compare id. § 103(c) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988) (both Americans with Disabili-
ties Act and Civil Rights Act exempt religious bodies from prohibition on employment of
persons of particular religious belief).
[Vol. 64:2:229
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ments established under the Drug Free Workplace Act." Drug
users or alcoholics may be held to the same standard for employ-
ment or job performance to which the employer holds other
individuals.3 7
Section 105 requires the employer to post notices "describing
the applicable provisions of the Act." ' Section 106 requires the
EEOC to issue regulations within one year of the date of enact-
ment, and section 108 provides that Title I will be effective
twenty-four months from the date of enactment.3 9 Of greatest im-
port is section 107, which ties enforcement of the ADA to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act by providing that the remedies and proce-
dures of Title VII shall apply to the ADA.
III. A CRITICAL LOOK
A. Coverage and Enforcement
The two areas where the ADA will have the most far-reaching
and immediate impact are: (1) coverage, which has been greatly
expanded; and (2) enforcement, which will be stepped up. These
changes are straightforward and are not likely to lead to a signifi-
cant amount of appellate litigation to determine their application.
Presently, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 covers two types of
employers. The first group is government contractors, who are cov-
ered by section 503. Specifically, this section applies to any con-
tract or subcontract in excess of $2,500 and requires the contrac-
tors and subcontractors to take affirmative action to employ and
advance qualified individuals with disabilities. ° The second group
of employers, covered by section 504, applies to recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance and any executive agency of the federal
government, including the United States Postal Service.4' Section
504 applies primarily to state and local governmental agencies, and
-1 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988).
,ADA, supra note 1, § 104, at S-4.
'8 Id. § 105, at S-4.
' Id. §§ 106, 108, at S-4, 5. The EEOC has had 17 years of similar experience with the
Rehabilitation Act. It should not take the EEOC a protracted length of time to promulgate
regulations, although it probably will. The shortcomings of the Act, discussed at length be-
low, are not going to be solved by more time. If solved at all, it will be done by the evolution
of the case law or statutory amendment.
40 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1990).
41 Id. § 794.
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colleges, universities, and public schools. Rarely is federal financial
assistance provided to the private, for-profit employer.42 While the
government contractor language covers most large employers and a
relatively high percentage of employees, it leaves unprotected a
significant number of employees who work for private organi-
zations.43
Four years from the date of its enactment, the ADA will cover
all employers with fifteen or more employees," making its coverage
identical to that of Title VII. For the first two years after its enact-
ment, however, there is an exception for employers with fifteen to
twenty-four employees.45
Perhaps the most interesting and positive change in the cover-
age aspects of the Act is that Congress makes itself subject to the
provisions of the Bill.46 This is a commendable reform, as one of
the most inequitable aspects of prior employment legislation has
been Congress' practice of exempting itself from coverage, follow-
ing a "do as I say, not as I do" approach.47
The enforcement provisions of the ADA are far more signifi-
cant in many respects than the coverage provisions. Under section
503, enforcement was delegated to the U.S. Department of Labor,
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP").48
While the OFCCP is a long-time enforcer of affirmative action pro-
grams under the Rehabilitation Act, an executive order,49 and the
Vietnam era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974,50 it
has been notoriously understaffed.51 The OFCCP has maintained
low visibility, and has been a poor stepsister of the EEOC. These
weaknesses have significantly affected the enforcement of the Re-
habilitation Act, particularly since a majority of courts have held
that there is no private right of action under section 503 of the
42 See id.
13 See id. § 793.
" ADA, supra note 1, § 101(5)(A), at S-3.
45 Id.
48 Id. § 509, at S-15.
41 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (excluding government agencies from definition
of "employer" within meaning of Civil Rights Act).
48 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1990).
49 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
50 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2026 (1988).
" In fiscal year 1989, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)
had an operating budget of $51,863,000. and a staff of 1,015 employees. In contrast to the
OFCCP, the EEOC had an operating budget of approximately $194,624,000 and a staff of
over 4,000.
[Vol. 64:2:229
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Act.52 Courts have upheld the OFCCP's discretionary authority
over enforcement decisions.5 Various other imaginative ap-
proaches to bring litigation of discrimination actions of persons
with disabilities under this section have failed as well. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that because employees with disabilities
are not intended to be third party beneficiaries of government con-
tracts, they are not permitted to sue employers under a third party
beneficiary theory."'
A private right of action exists under section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act.55 However, because it applies only to federal agen-
cies and recipients of federal financial assistance, it has virtually
no application to the private sector. While this private right of ac-
tion applies only to federal agencies, 6 it is not limited to those
programs where the primary purpose of federal funding is to pro-
mote employment.5 7 There are, however, limitations, which may
52 See, e.g., Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414 (10th Cir.) (for-
mer railroad employee has no private right of action against former employer under Reha-
bilitation Act when employee dismissed for incorrect statements on job application), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 822 (1984); Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077 (3d
Cir. 1982) (former employee has no private right of action against former employer under
Rehabilitation Act when employee alleges dismissal due to epilepsy).
11 See, e.g., Moon v. Donovan, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1780 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(federal district court lacks jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus against Secretary of La-
bor for failure to institute administrative action against government contractor that dis-
missed employee due to disability), aff'd, 747 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1055 (1985).
" See D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1483-84 (7th Cir. 1985); Howard
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Meyerson v. Arizona, 709
F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff cannot circumvent rule that no private right of
action exists by asserting section 793 rights via 42 U.S.C. section 1983), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
11 See Cousins v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Transp., 857 F.2d 37, 44-46 (1st
Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 880 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1989); Smith v. United States
Postal Serv., 766 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1985). Remedies for violations of section 504 are the
same as those set forth in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988).
11 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 636
(1984).
'7 However, the Court found that Congress intended to prohibit "employment discrimi-
nation regardless of purpose of the federal financial assistance." Darrone, 465 U.S. at 635.
The issues of what constitutes federal financial assistance and whether the timing of such
assistance might affect the plaintiff's standing to sue have also been addressed. See, e.g.,
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 707-08 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (board operating certificates held not to be federal financial assistance), rev'd on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 597 (1986); Lemmo v. Wilson, 583 F. Supp. 557, 560 (D. Colo. 1984)
(certification of apprenticeship program by Department of Labor held not financial assis-
tance); Bachman v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (D.N.J.
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challenge plaintiffs to address various jurisdictional issues. 8
Under the ADA, the issues of a private right of action and
standing will virtually disappear because it adopts the Title VII
procedures and remedies.59 This will give disabled individuals the
right to sue for reinstatement or hiring, retroactive compensation,
and such other equitable relief the court deems appropriate."0
During the course of the ADA's enactment, controversy cen-
tered on its procedures and remedies. The initial versions of the
Bill provided that enforcement would be consistent with the reme-
dies and procedures set forth in Title VII and 42 U.S.C. section
1981. Under section 1981, the plaintiff is entitled to compensatory
and punitive damages, and, more importantly, to a jury trial6 1 The
Bush Administration opposed the inclusion of section 1981 reme-
dies and procedures and conditioned its support for the ADA on
the understanding that this portion of the Bill would be deleted. 2
The Senate's final version of the Bill reflected this trade off.63
Before the House's version passed in the House, the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 was introduced in Congress.6 4 One of the Bill's provi-
sions sought to amend Title VII to provide for punitive and com-
pensatory damages and jury trials.6 5 Since the Bush Administra-
tion believed that Congress had not lived up to its end of the
bargain, Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.) of-
fered an amendment to the House version of the Bill that would
have limited the ADA's remedies and procedures to the current
remedies and procedures of Title VII, i.e., no punitive and com-
pensatory damages or jury trials. The amendment failed in the
House by a vote of 192 to 227, shortly before the ADA was
passed.6 While the Bush Administration strongly supported the
Sensenbrenner amendment, the view that the ADA should provide
1983) (agency no longer receiving assistance may be sued for discrimination that occurred
while it was receiving assistance).
"8 For instance, the Court has interpreted the statute to ban discrimination only in the
specific program receiving federal funds. See Darrone, 465 U.S. at 636.
" ADA, supra note 1, § 107(a), at S-4.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
68 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
82 Statement of Acting Assistant Attorney General James Turner Before House Small
Business Committee on Americans with Disabilities Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at
D-1 (Feb. 23, 1990).
63 Id. at D-3.
4 See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
"' Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at D-2 (Feb. 23 1990).
88 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at A-16, 17 (May 23, 1990).
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disabled persons with the same rights and remedies afforded to
women and minorities under Title VII prevailed.6 7 It appears, how-
ever, that this battle will be fought another day as the Civil Rights
Act of 1990 winds its way to final consideration-with the ADA
provisions following the same course as the rest of Title VII.
Although the foregoing changes in coverage, remedies, and
procedures are significant and will impact immediately on the civil
rights of the disabled when the ADA becomes effective, they will
not present much of a challenge to the legal profession. In contrast,
the issues discussed below are likely to present the greater chal-
lenge, as employers will have to grapple with them in the first in-
stance, and the legal community thereafter.
B. Who is Protected?
1. Defining "Disability"
One of the issues likely to lead to considerable litigation is de-
termining who is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA. As
previously indicated, there is no substantive difference between the
term "disability," as used in the ADA, and the term "handicap," as
used under the Rehabilitation Act. 8
The first prong of the definition deals with an individual with
a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual."69 The Senate
Report defines a "physical or mental impairment" as:
(1) any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs;
respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive;
digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine; or (2) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities."
However, the report goes on to say that "[i]t is not possible to in-
clude in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, diseases,
or infections that would constitute physical or mental impair-
07 Id.
'8 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 21.
" ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(A), at S-3.
70 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 22.
1990]
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ments."71 Yet it also states that the term "physical or mental im-
pairment" does not include simple physical characteristics (e.g.,
blue eyes or black hair), the existence of a prison record, age, and
sexual orientation.7
2
Of considerable importance are the issues concerning AIDS.
Congress devoted much attention to the protection of persons with
this disease. The Senate Report states that "a person infected with
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("AIDS") is covered. 7  The
coverage of AIDS was discussed again on the Senate floor by Sena-
tor Kennedy (D-Mass.), a sponsor of the legislation. He said that
"the legislation implemented a recommendation of the Presidential
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic by
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. This issue, however, was the last to be resolved in conference before the bill be-
came law. On June 6, 1990, the Senate passed a motion to instruct Senate conferees to
accept a House-passed amendment permitting employers to refuse to assign individuals
with AIDS or HIV virus to food handling positions. The amendment was intended primarily
to shield restaurants and other employers in the food industry from a possible loss of cus-
tomers if they were forced under the ADA to place employees with AIDS or other communi-
cable diseases in food handling jobs.
The House-approved amendment reads as follows:
Food-Handling Jobs-It shall not be a violation of this Act for an employer to
refuse to assign or continue to assign any employee with an infectious or commu-
nicable disease of public health significance to a job involving food handling, pro-
vided that the employer shall make reasonable accommodation that would offer
an alternative employment opportunity for which the employee is qualified and
for which the employee would sustain no economic damage.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 110, at A-12 (June 7, 1990). This issue was finally resolved in
conference with the addition of section 103(d) to the ADA, which provides as follows:
(d) LIST OF INFECTIOUS AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary of Health and Human Services, not
later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, shall-
(A) review all infectious and communicable diseases which may
be transmitted through handling the food supply;
(B) publish a list of infectious and communicable diseases which
are transmitted through handling the food supply;
(C) publish the methods by which such diseases are transmitted;
and
(D) widely disseminate such information regarding the list of dis-
eases and their modes of transmissability to the general public. Such
list shall be updated annually.
(2) APPLICATIONS.-In any case in which an individual has an infectious
or communicable disease that it transmitted to others through the handling
of food, that is included on the list developed by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services under paragraph (1), and which cannot be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation, a covered entity may refuse to assign or
continue to assign such individual to a job involving food handling.
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prohibiting discrimination against those who test positive for the
AIDS virus. 17 4 This brought about extensive discussion on the
Senate floor, including a floor amendment sponsored by Senator
Armstrong (R-Colo.) specifying that the Bill does not cover "'ho-
mosexuality,' 'bisexuality,' 'transvestism,' 'pedophilia,' 'transsexu-
alism,' 'exhibitionism,' 'voyeurism,' 'compulsive gambling,' klepto-
mania or pyromania, gender identity disorders, current
psychoactive substance use disorders, [and] current psychoactive
substance-induced organic mental disorders.., which are not the
result of medical treatment, or other sexual behavior disorders. '75
Although the amendment eliminated a wide variety of disorders
from coverage, persons who test positive for HIV still appear to be
covered.
Disputes will inevitably arise over what constitutes a substan-
tial limitation on "one or more of major life activities of [an] indi-
vidual.176 The Senate Report does not assist in answering this
question as it merely states that "[p]ersons with minor, trivial im-
pairments, such as a simple infected finger are not impaired in a
major life activity. '7 7 Use of such an obvious and oblique example
leaves unresolved, for example, the question of whether a person
with a broken leg or other temporary disability is excluded.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, there have been numerous cases
discussing the issue of whether an individual is handicapped .7 For
example, the Sixth Circuit has held that the term does not encom-
pass characteristics that merely render an individual incapable of
performing particular jobs.7 9 Whether this ruling will apply to the
ADA is yet to be determined. Furthermore, a district court has
held that transitory illnesses, which have no permanent effect on a
(3) CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this Act shall be construed to preempt,
modify, or amend any State, county, or local law, ordinance, or regulation
applicable to food handling which is designed to protect the public health
from individuals who pose a significant risk to the health or safety of
others, which cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation, pursu-
ant to the list of infectious or communicable diseases and the modes of
transmissability published by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
ADA, supra note 1, § 103(d), at S-4. Ironically, based upon current medical information,
AIDS is not likely to make this list.
7 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 174, at A-6, 7 (Sept. 11, 1989).
75 135 CoNG. REc. S10833 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
7' ADA, supra note 1, § 3(2)(A), at S-3.
77 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 23.
71 See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 78-84.
79 See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985).
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person's health are not disabilities.8 0 Neither the ADA nor its legis-
lative history address this issue. The Fifth Circuit has held that
left-handedness is not a disability.8' The Fourth Circuit has main-
tained that acrophobia was not a disability where the plaintiff tes-
tified that his fear of heights had never affected his work prior to
his present job. 2
In School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,8 3 the
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether a person with a
contagious disease is handicapped within the meaning of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court ruled that the Rehabilita-
tion Act covers any contagious disease which substantially limits a
major life activity of an otherwise covered person.84 The Arline
Court focused on the third prong of the definition of handicap/
disability, that of an individual "regarded as having such an im-
pairment." The Court in Arline explained: "Such an impairment
might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but
could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work
as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment."8 5
Varying interpretations of the second and third prongs of the
statutory definition of "disability" may occasionally lead to litiga-
tion. The first prong, however, is more susceptible to expansion
and will probably be the subject of substantial litigation.
2. Defining "Qualified Individual with a Disability"
More troublesome than the definition of disability is the issue
of who is a "qualified individual with a disability." Section 101(8)
of the ADA defines such a person as "an individual with a disabil-
ity who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such indi-
vidual holds or desires." 8
The definition hinges largely on the phrase "essential func-
tions." The Senate Report provides that "the phrase 'essential
80 See Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
81 See de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986).
82 Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
83 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
84 Id. at 284.
88 Id. at 283.
86 ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), at S-3. Comparable terms are found in sections 501 and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, §§ 501,
504, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (1988)).
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functions' means job tasks that are fundamental and not margi-
nal," and that "[t]he point of including this phrase within the defi-
nition.., is to ensure that employers can continue to require that
all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are
able to perform the essential, i.e., non-marginal functions of the
job in question. ' 87 The report further states that "the employer's
judgment regarding what functions are essential as a matter of
business necessity" should be given consideration. 8 Again we are
faced with the question of what functions are essential. Assuming,
arguendo, that any function which accounts for fifty percent of a
job is essential, we must ask, what about thirty-three percent,
twenty percent, or ten percent? Is a percentage even a relevant
consideration? Moreover, in a. multi-dimensional job there are usu-
ally several necessary functions. This is particularly true for pro-
fessionals and those in management. What individual functions are
"essential"? Maybe no individual function by itself is truly essen-
tial. If one function is not essential, do two or three or more in
combination become "essential"? Truly absurd results could ensue
if combinations are not allowed.
Employers may take some solace from that part of the defini-
tion of "essential functions" which states:
For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential,
and if an employer has prepared a written description before ad-
vertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description
shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job. 8
For the most part, however, this provision will not be very reassur-
ing to employers on closer reading. Merely giving "consideration
• * * to the employer's judgment" means very little, except that it
cannot be totally disregarded and should assure that the evidence
is admissible, just as previously prepared, written descriptions will
be admissible. But Congress provides no guidance as to what
weight this evidence should provide. Surely this evidence would or
should be admissible. In fairness, previously prepared, written de-
scriptions, unless prepared as a subterfuge of the Act, should be
given great deference.
87 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 26.
I !d.
ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), at S-3 (emphasis added).
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Additionally, the word "qualified" will affect application of the
ADA. The Senate Report states that it "intends to reaffirm that
this legislation does not undermine an employer's ability to choose
and maintain qualified workers.""0 To that end the report contin-
ued that "an employer is still free to select the most qualified ap-
plicant[s] available and to make decisions based on reasons unre-
lated to the existence or consequence of a disability."91
The Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the words "oth-
erwise qualified" as used in the Rehabilitation Act in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis,92 where a deaf person was denied ad-
mission into a clinical nursing program. Holding that the applicant
was not "otherwise qualified," the Court determined that "[a]n
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a pro-
gram's requirements in spite of his handicap." 93 What if we substi-
tute the word "job" for "program?" To be "qualified," must a per-
son meet all the job's requirements? Or does the use of the word
"essential" in the definition modify Southeastern Community Col-
lege? If so, then can the nurse with a hearing disability still func-
tion as a clinical nurse although she would not necessarily be una-
ble to perform many of the functions that a clinical nurse must
perform? May the employer pay her less if she does not perform
all the functions of the job?
In Arline, the Supreme Court remanded the case to determine
whether the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for her job.94 The
Court directed the trial court "to conduct an individualized in-
quiry and make appropriate findings of fact."95 Congress appears
to follow the Supreme Court's lead. But by forcing individualized
inquiries, the EEOC will have difficulty drafting regulations; em-
ployers and ultimately the courts will have little guidance in mak-
ing their individual decisions.
The Senate Report also discusses the issue of the "individual
[who by virtue of his disability] poses a direct threat to the health
90 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 26.
91 Id.
92 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
'3 Id. at 406.
" Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
"' Id. at 287. Specifically, the trial court was instructed to conduct an individualized
inquiry "'based on reasonable medical judgments ... about (a) the nature of the risk...
(b) the duration of the risk ... (c) the severity of the risk ... and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm.'"
[Vol. 64:2:229
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
or safety of others or poses a direct threat to property."'96 Unfortu-
nately, by stating that these determinations should be made on "a
case-by-case basis," the Senate is once again encouraging factual
disputes. According to the report, the employer would have to
specify the risk that the disabled individual might pose, then
demonstrate "that no reasonable accommodation is available that
can remove the risk. ' 97 Similarly, if an employer alleges that a
mental disability is a potential threat to the health or safety of
others, the employer is required to specify the behavior that poses
the anticipated threat. Again, the Senate Report "requires a fact-
specific individualized inquiry resulting in a 'well-informed judg-
ment grounded in a careful and open-minded weighing of the risks
and alternatives.' "98
The term "qualification standards," which appears in section
103 of the ADA, is a defense related to the term "qualified individ-
ual with a disability." Qualification standards permit an employer
to require that employees must not be a danger to the health or
safety of other employees. 9 This language was adopted from Ar-
line which required an "individualized inquiry" and is similar to
the language in the Senate Report mandating a case-by-case, fact-
specific, inquiry.
C. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
What sets disability discrimination apart from almost any
other type of prohibited discrimination, is that the employer must
make reasonable accommodations for the employee's disability in
addition to not discriminating against the disabled individual.
That is, favored rather than simply equal treatment is required.
The term "reasonable accommodation" appears throughout
the Act. For example, the definition of a "qualified individual with
a disability" is one who "with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment posi-
tion."100 Next, under section 102, the statute defines discrimination
to include:
9' SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27.
97 Id.
I' Id. (quoting Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988),
quoting Arline v. School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida, 772 F.2d 759, 764-65 (11th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 480 U.S. 273 (1987)).
99 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 40.
100 ADA, supra note 1, § 101(8), at S-3.
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(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of
such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to
make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental im-
pairments of the employee or applicant[.] 10
Then under section 103, the statute sets forth defenses to include:
(a) In General - It may be a defense to a charge of discrimi-
nation under this Act that an alleged application of qualification
standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with
a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with
business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished
by reasonable accommodation .... 102
Considering their significance, it is not surprising that the def-
initions of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" are
set forth in Title J.103 Again, a case-by-case approach has been
adopted to determine whether a particular accommodation is rea-
sonable. The case-by-case analysis is required by the definitions,
the Senate Report, and the case law interpreting the term "reason-
able accommodation" under the Rehabilitation Act.
"Reasonable accommodation" is defined by the statute as
follows:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include -
(A) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disa-
bilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition
or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate ad-
justment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for indi-
101 Id. § 102(5)(A)-(B), at S-13 (emphasis added).
102 Id. § 103(a), at S-4 (emphasis added).
... Id. § 101(8)-(9), at S-3.
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viduals with disabilities.'O
The Senate Report states:
The definition includes illustrations of accommodations that
may be required in appropriate circumstances. The list is not
meant to be exhaustive; rather, it is intended to provide general
guidance about the nature of the obligation. Furthermore, the list
is not meant to suggest that employers must follow all of the ac-
tions listed in each particular case. Rather, the decision as to
what reasonable accommodation is appropriate is one which must
be determined based on the particular facts of the individual
case. This fact-specific case-by-case approach to providing reason-
able accommodations is generally consistent with the interpreta-
tions of this phrase under ... the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1°5
Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have followed a case-by-
case analysis. For example, in Trimble v. Carlin,106 the Postal Ser-
vice was found liable because it failed to demonstrate that certain
duties of an injured employee must be performed without accom-
modation, that is, without the assistance of equipment.1 0 7 How-
ever, in Baker v. Department of Environmental Conservation,"" a
district court held that the employer did not violate the Rehabili-
tation Act because the Act did not require the granting of special
permission for the use of motorized vehicles in designated wilder-
ness areas by plaintiffs with disabilities. 09 The court reasoned that
this was not a reasonable accommodation since the use of such ve-
hicles "would be inimical to the nature of these areas."'" 0 In still
another case, Vickers v. Veterans Administration,"' the Veterans
Administration was held to have sufficiently accommodated an em-
ployee with hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke by separating the
desks of smokers and non-smokers and seeking improvements in
the ventilation and exhaust systems." 2 The foregoing cases
frowned upon narrowly individualized claims and are probably
representative of the case-by-case analysis to be seen under the
ADA.
1- Id. § 101(9)(A)-(B), at S-3.
10' SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 31.
"1 633 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
107 Id. at 370.
"1 634 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
0 Id. at 1466.
110 Id.
" 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
12 Id. at 89-90.
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In two cases with broader implications, the courts found that
reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to move a
disabled worker to a new or different position. In Dexler v. United
States Postal Service,11 a district court held that reasonable ac-
commodation does not require the employer to "consider handi-
capped applicants for jobs for which they have not applied, assum-
ing that the employer does not do so for applicants who are not
handicapped.""11 4 In Carty v. Carlin,"5 the court stated that rea-
sonable accommodation "does not include a requirement to reas-
sign or transfer an employee to another position. Preferential reas-
signment for handicapped employees was not intended by the
Rehabilitation Act. 1" 6 However, the ADA calls into question the
continued viability of these interpretations. The examples set forth
in the ADA, as well as the comments contained in the Senate Re-
port, suggest a major departure from the Rehabilitation Act. In
contrast to the holding in Carty, the term "reasonable accommoda-
tion" under section 101 may include "job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, [or] reassignment to a vacant
position.""17
Further, the statute calls for "the provision of qualified read-
ers or interpreters . . . for individuals with disabilities.""' 8 The
Senate Report states that:
The legislation ... explicitly includes provision of qualified read-
ers of [sic] interpreters as examples of reasonable accommoda-
tions. As with readers and interpreters, the provision of an at-
tendant to assist a person with a disability during parts of the
workday may be a reasonable accommodation depending on the
circumstances of the individual case. Attendants may, for exam-
ple, be required for traveling and other job-related functions." 9
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 20 the Supreme
Court held that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act did not re-
quire the petitioner to provide the respondent with individualized
attention as part of the clinical training in a nursing program, not-
113 40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 633 (D. Conn. 1986).
"I Id. at 639.
..5 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985).
,, Id. at 1188.
',' ADA, supra note 1, § 101 (9)(A), (B), at S-3 (emphasis added).
Its Id.
', SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 33 (emphasis added).
,, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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withstanding Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") regulations
which provided for " 'auxiliary' aids such as sign language inter-
preters. ' 121 The Court stated, "an interpretation of the regulations
that required the extensive modifications necessary to include re-
spondent in the nursing program would raise grave doubts about
their validity. ' 122 Congress appears to have accomplished in the
ADA what the Supreme Court was unwilling to do under the Reha-
bilitation Act.
Further evidence of how broadly Congress views the term
"reasonable accommodation" can be found in its analysis of the
interrelationship between collective bargaining agreements and the
duty to accommodate. The Senate Report states that "if a collec-
tive bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employees with
a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in
determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign an
employee with a disability without seniority to that job. 1 23 To
even suggest that the sacrosanct seniority provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement may be attacked is troublesome. It is one
thing to attack seniority provisions adopted because of a historical
pattern of discrimination based on race and to permit plaintiffs to
seek their "rightful place," but granting super-seniority attacks
one of organized labors most cherished tenets.
Another Supreme Court decision that will be affected by the
ADA is Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.1 24 In Ansonia,
an employee denied the use of so-called personal business days for
the observance of religious holy days brought suit under Title VII.
The Court held that the employer need not accept the employee's
accommodation proposals.125 However, the Senate Report suggests
a contrary result under the ADA. It states that "[t]he expressed
choice of the applicant or employee shall be given primary consid-
eration unless another effective accommodation exists that would
provide a meaningful equal employment opportunity or that the
accommodation requested would pose an undue hardship. 1 26
Thus, in determining what is a reasonable accommodation
121 Id. at 408 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978)).
122 Id. at 410.
123 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 32.
124 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
125 Id. at 68. In Ansonia, the Court stated that "where the employer has already reason-
ably accommodated the employee's religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end." Id.
126 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 35 (emphasis added).
1990]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Congress apparently intends to disregard earlier Supreme Court
decisions under both the Rehabilitation Act and Title VII.
A closer look at the definition of "undue hardship," which is
inextricably linked 127 to "reasonable accommodation," confirms the
foregoing observation. The Senate Report articulates Congress' in-
tent to change the definition from that found in Title VII. The
report reads:
[T]he Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, (citation
omitted) are not applicable to this legislation. In Hardison, the
Supreme Court concluded that under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons with reli-
gious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a de
minimis cost for the employer."12
There is no question that under the ADA, an undue hardship
would require a finding of more than a de minimis cost incurred by
the employer. The statute defines "undue hardship" as "an action
requiring significant difficulty or expense."' 29 The Senate Report
speaks of "an action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial,
disruptive, or that will fundamentally alter the nature of the
program.' 3 0
Not only has the substantive law changed, making it more dif-
ficult for employers to prove undue hardship, but here again, the
statute dictates an ad hoc inquiry to determine what constitutes an
"undue hardship." The Senate Report states that the court should
consider several factors in its determination:
(1) the overall size of the business of the covered entity with
respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities
and size of the budget; (2) the type of operation maintained by
the covered entity, including the composition and structure of the
entity's workforce; and (3) the nature and cost of the accommoda-
tion needed.13'
12 See, e.g., ADA, supra note 1, § 102(b)(5)(A), at S-3. These two are linked in the
ADA's discussion of what constitutes discrimination: [The term discrimination includes] not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an oth-
erwise qualified individual who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity." Id.
128 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 36.
129 ADA, supra note 1, § 101(10)(A), at S-3.
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 35.
'S' SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 36.
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The Senate Report further states that whether an undue hardship
exists will depend on various factors, including the type of accom-
modation, the expense involved, and the employer's financial con-
dition.1 32 The report relied on the appendix accompanying an
HEW regulation which contrasted the requirement placed on a
small day care center to expend a nominal sum, with a large school
district required to incur a much greater expense. 133
This approach may be a cause of distress to employers and
will encourage satellite litigation. A decision handed down by a
Pennsylvania district court construing the Rehabilitation Act may
indicate where the ADA is headed. In Nelson v. Thornburgh,T
the court weighed the social costs of denying an accommodation
against the economic cost to the employer. In holding that the
state was required to provide readers to blind income maintenance
workers as a reasonable accommodation, the court relied on HEW
regulations that specified the following facts to be assessed for pur-
poses of reasonable accommodation:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to the
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of
budget; (2) The type of recipient's operation, including the com-
position and structure of the recipient's workforce; and (3) The
nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 135
In essence, the ADA considers the same factors. In Nelson, the
employees were first-level welfare agency workers responsible for
receiving and recording information from welfare applicants and
determining eligibility for benefits. 36 Their duties involved exten-
sive paperwork with standardized forms.137 The court reasoned
that the social costs of excluding the plaintiffs from their profes-
sion far outweighed the modest cost of accommodation upon the
financially sound employer, in this case, the state.13
If this type of social welfare standard is accepted under the
ADA, it could strip large, and perhaps not-so-large employers of
any undue hardship defense. Moreover, it establishes a unique
232 Id.
133 Id.
1 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mem., 732 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985).
Id. at 379 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1982)).
Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 371-72.
237 Id.
1:1 Id. at 382.
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form of socialism. Instead of the government providing jobs for the
disabled as may be done in traditionally socialized countries, em-
ployers are forced to provide jobs for the disabled and thus alone
shoulder, what should be, at least in part, society's burdens.' Fur-
ther, the government has offered n'o financial assistance to aid em-
ployers who may be faced with added expenses, such as paying for




The ADA, while well-conceived and well-intended, will place
an onerous burden on employers. Moreover, it will induce consid-
erable litigation to determine who is "disabled" and who is a
"qualified individual with a disability." "Reasonable accommoda-
tion" and "undue hardship" must be approached on a case-by-case
basis. Certainly, the EEOC regulations cannot fully resolve such
problems for several years, if ever. Thus, the ADA will lack clear
guidelines of conduct for employers to follow. Without adequate
notice of how to comply with the ADA, employers and employees
alike will have to resort to the courts continuously to answer even
the most rudimentary inquiries. When they do, the cases will not
be resolved easily. While motions for summary judgment have
been a useful procedure to weed out the other types of frivolous
Title VII actions, the "individualized, case-by-case" approach to
disability claims will not lend itself very well to such motions.
Furthermore, as the Civil Rights Bill of 1990 will most likely
become law, having been passed in both houses, and, under some
circumstances, will include the right to a jury trial, the ADA will
become a free-for-all. Every "individualized inquiry" will be a
jury question. The jury will sit virtually as a court of equity with-
out meaningful legal guidance. While some of the laudable objec-
tives of the ADA undoubtedly will be achieved, there is no doubt
that numerous ADA claims will be asserted by attorneys playing
the jury wheel of fortune.
139 Compare, for example, pensions, health insurance and income with social security
tax collection. More and more, the employer, both public and private, is becoming the
agency to provide these benefits or services.
14o The Internal Revenue Code section 51, does provide "targeted jobs credit" in certain
limited situations, i.e., for individuals with physical or mental disabilities constituting a sub-
stantial handicap to employment who have been referred after completing or while receiving
vocational rehabilitation services. See I.R.C. § 51 (1990).
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